Daniel Saranchak v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-14-2015 
Daniel Saranchak v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Daniel Saranchak v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 972. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/972 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                            
_____________ 
 
No. 12-9002 
_____________ 
 
DANIEL M. SARANCHAK, 
                                               Appellant 
 v. 
 
 SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS;  
 DAVID DIGUGLIELMO, Superintendent of the  
State Correctional Institution of Graterford;  
 FRANK TENNIS, Superintendent of the  
State Correctional Institution at Rockview;  
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 1-05-cv-00317 
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo                             
 
Argued July 16, 2015 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 2 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 14, 2015) 
 
 
Matthew C. Lawry 
Stuart B. Lev   [ARGUED] 
Shawn Nolan 
Federal Community Defender Office for 
  the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
Trial Unit 
601 Walnut Street 
The Curtis Center 
Suite 540 West 
Philadelphia, PA  19106 
  
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
James P. Barker 
Jennifer A. Peterson  [ARGUED] 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
Appeals & Legal Services 
Strawberry Square 
16th Floor 
Harrisburg, PA  17120 
  
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This is the second appeal from District Court action on 
Daniel Saranchak’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 
following his conviction on first degree murder charges of 
killing both his grandmother, Stella Saranchok,1 and his 
uncle, Edmund Saranchak.  The first issue Saranchak raises in 
this appeal is whether the District Court erred when it rejected 
Saranchak’s claim that the degree-of-guilt phase of his trial in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, 
Pennsylvania was suffused with prejudice from the 
cumulative errors arising out of his counsel’s performance at 
trial.  Second, Saranchak appeals from the denial of his claim 
that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective at the penalty 
phase of his trial.  For the reasons we explain below, we will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of Saranchak’s claims 
pertaining to trial counsel’s conduct at the degree-of-guilt 
phase.  We will reverse, however, the District Court’s 
judgment as to penalty and vacate Saranchak’s sentence of 
death.  If the Commonwealth still seeks the death penalty for 
Saranchak, the Commonwealth must conduct a new 
sentencing hearing. 
                                                 
1 As we noted in our first opinion, Saranchak’s grandmother 
spelled her surname differently from her grandson. 
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I. 
 Because this is the second time we have reviewed 
Saranchak’s degree-of-guilt hearing, we will assume 
familiarity with our opinion in Saranchak v. Beard 
(Saranchak I), 616 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2010), and recount only 
that factual and procedural background necessary to this 
appeal.  This case comes to us following Saranchak’s open 
plea of guilty to murdering his grandmother and uncle, his 
conviction on two counts of first-degree murder following a 
nonjury degree-of-guilt hearing conducted pursuant to Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 803(A), and a jury’s subsequent determination that 
Saranchak should be sentenced to death for his crimes.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Saranchak’s 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  Saranchak then 
sought state postconviction relief pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541–9546, asserting that his attorney at 
trial, Kent Watkins, had been constitutionally ineffective.  
The PCRA court—the same judge who presided over both 
phases of Saranchak’s trial—held an evidentiary hearing but 
denied relief.  Commonwealth v. Saranchak (Saranchak-
PCRA), No. 889, 889A-1993 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 8, 2003).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately2 affirmed the 
denial of Saranchak’s PCRA claims.  Commonwealth v. 
Saranchak (Saranchak-Pa.), 866 A.2d 292 (Pa. 2005). 
                                                 
2 For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court initially vacated the denial of Saranchak’s 
PCRA petition so that Saranchak could file an amended 
petition.  After the PCRA court denied the amended PCRA 
petition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 
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 Saranchak then petitioned for habeas corpus in the 
District Court, again arguing that his trial counsel’s 
ineffectiveness had deprived him of a fair trial.  The District 
Court granted habeas relief on the grounds that trial counsel 
had unreasonably “fail[ed] to investigate, discover, and 
present evidence to support a diminished capacity defense,” 
and had unreasonably failed to litigate suppression issues 
related to Saranchak’s confessions both to law enforcement 
following his arrest as well as to a Schuylkill County 
Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) caseworker.  
Saranchak v. Beard, 538 F. Supp. 2d 847, 891 (M.D. Pa. 
2008).  The District Court left unresolved several alternative 
grounds for relief, including counsel’s ineffectiveness during 
the penalty phase of Saranchak’s trial.  The Commonwealth 
appealed, and we reversed the District Court’s judgment.  
Saranchak I, 616 F.3d at 314.  We also remanded the case for 
consideration of Saranchak’s remaining claims.   
 On remand, considering all of Saranchak’s remaining 
arguments, the District Court denied relief.  Pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
22(b), and Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 22.2, the 
District Court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) 
regarding “whether the court properly resolved the issues of 
whether Saranchak was denied effective assistance of counsel 
at his capital sentencing.”  Saranchak v. Beard (Saranchak 
II), Civil No. 1:05-CV-0317, 2012 WL 1414344, at *35 
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012).3  We also granted in part 
                                                 
3 The District Court also granted a COA as to its resolution of 
Saranchak’s claim regarding “whether the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury on the mitigating circumstance of extreme 
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Saranchak’s motion to expand the COA to include “whether, 
at the penalty phase, the trial court unconstitutionally 
deprived [Saranchak] of the use of a mental health expert and 
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the 
appointment of such an expert” under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68 (1985), as well as “whether the cumulative 
prejudicial effect of any errors in this case undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.”  App. 53–54.   
 Regarding the degree-of-guilt hearing, Saranchak 
focuses on the cumulative impact of three alleged errors by 
trial counsel.  According to Saranchak, these errors 
collectively undermine the trial court’s finding of 
premeditated intent in the commission of the murders.  First, 
Saranchak argues that his trial counsel failed to move to 
suppress Saranchak’s confession to Pennsylvania State Police 
officers made after his arrest.  In that confession, Saranchak 
admitted to killing his uncle.  As we explained in Saranchak 
I, testimony during Saranchak’s degree-of-guilt hearing 
revealed that during his interrogation 
Saranchak [had] acted as if the officers 
questioning him were drill sergeants, 
responding to their questions with formal ‘Yes, 
Sir’ or ‘No, Sir’ answers.  He soon admitted 
that he had been present at Stella’s house, but 
then rebuffed the officers’ follow-up questions 
                                                                                                             
mental or emotional disturbance and counsel’s failure to 
object.”  Saranchak II, 2012 WL 1414344, at *35.  In his 
opening brief in this court, Saranchak abandoned this claim, 
so we need not consider it further.  Appellant’s Br., at 5 n.1.   
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by explaining that he was part of a classified 
military mission.  After further questioning, he 
characterized the scene at Stella’s house as ‘not 
a pretty sight.’  Saranchak eventually admitted 
to the state trooper interrogating him that he had 
shot Edmund. 
Saranchak I, 616 F.3d at 298.  But Saranchak did not confess 
to killing his grandmother, instead “maintaining firmly that 
such information was classified.”  Id.  We noted that “the 
State Police probably did violate Saranchak’s Miranda rights” 
when they continued to question Saranchak, despite his 
“probably sufficient” invocation of his right to remain silent 
through his “assertions that the information was classified.”  
Id. at 306. 
 But this was not Saranchak’s only confession.  
Saranchak also separately described the killings, including his 
motive, to Laurie Garber, a Children and Youth Services 
caseworker with whom Saranchak met to discuss his three 
children while he was awaiting trial.  Garber testified that 
Saranchak “admitted to killing his uncle” and that Saranchak 
“had killed him because of years of being talked about and 
greed.”  App. 190.  Indeed, Saranchak complained that his 
uncle’s children had received an inheritance upon his 
grandfather’s passing, yet Saranchak and his siblings 
inherited nothing.  Further, Saranchak told Garber that his 
grandmother had been “very sick with cancer,” from which 
Garber received the impression that Saranchak believed “he 
was doing [his grandmother] a favor because she was so 
sick.”  App. 192.  Garber also reported that Saranchak had 
claimed he was not intoxicated on the night of the killings, 
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yet he had nevertheless “snapped.”  App. 190.  But Saranchak 
denied robbing his uncle and his grandmother.  Although 
Saranchak had previously challenged the admission of this 
confession to Garber as violating his Fifth Amendment rights, 
we concluded that Saranchak’s responses to Garber’s 
questions did not implicate his privilege against self-
incrimination because their conversation did not amount to an 
interrogation.  Saranchak I, 616 F.3d at 305. 
 In his second claim of error, Saranchak contends that 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek suppression of 
testimony from a cooperating witness, Roy Miles.  Miles, 
testifying pursuant to a plea agreement, was the only 
eyewitness to the killings and testified in depth as to 
Saranchak’s behavior that evening.  According to Miles, he 
and Saranchak were drinking at a bar on the night of the 
murders when their conversation turned to where they might 
get some money.  Saranchak volunteered that he knew of a 
source, but they “might have to shoot someone.”  App. 162.4  
                                                 
4 Miles would later recant this statement, admitting that he 
and Saranchak had never planned to steal any money from 
Saranchak’s grandmother.  During the PCRA hearing, Miles 
claimed that he could not remember telling police that 
Saranchak had stated they “may have to shoot somebody.”  
App. 840.  Nevertheless, according to Miles “they told [him] 
that [he] had to testify against Mr. Saranchak at his trial” and 
that “this is what [he] had to say when [he] was asked . . . this 
question.”  App. 840–41.  Miles’s testimony was not clear as 
to who instructed him to testify in this fashion.  On cross 
examination at the PCRA hearing, Miles suggested that the 
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Miles then accompanied Saranchak to Saranchak’s 
stepfather’s home, where Saranchak met his girlfriend and 
obtained a rifle.  Miles and Saranchak then went to another 
bar, where Saranchak commented that he “wanted to load the 
trash up in the truck to do a crime” in Virginia and “[t]hat 
way it [would] look[] like we were there for a purpose.”  App. 
163.  Rather than driving to Virginia, however, Saranchak 
took Miles to his grandmother’s home. 
 Miles then testified that upon their arrival, Saranchak 
declared that he was “going in to get some money off [his] 
grandmother.”  App. 164.  Miles followed Saranchak into the 
home, where they found Saranchak’s uncle asleep on the 
couch.  Without saying a word, Saranchak shot his sleeping 
uncle in the head immediately upon entering.  When a dog 
entered the room, Saranchak reassured Miles that “[t]he dog 
used to be [Saranchak’s] dog and he wasn’t going to bark.”  
App. 164.  Saranchak then ascended the stairs to his 
grandmother’s bedroom and attempted to hand Miles the rifle.  
Miles refused.  After Saranchak’s grandmother called out to 
her grandson, Saranchak shot her in the head as well.5  Miles 
                                                                                                             
prosecutor as well as his own attorney gave him this 
“impression.”  App. 846. 
5 Law enforcement testified at trial that both Edmund 
Saranchak and Stella Saranchok had been shot in “the center 
of [the] forehead.”  App. 124–25.  But the autopsy revealed 
that the bullet had entered Saranchak’s uncle “through the left 
upper eyelid.”  App. 1122.  The police report of the initial 
investigation also indicated that Saranchak’s grandmother’s 
gunshot wound was located on the “right eyebrow.”  App. 
1119–20.  
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also claimed that Saranchak took his uncle’s wallet before 
both he and Saranchak returned to a bar.  See also Saranchak 
I, 616 F.3d at 297–98 (discussing additional details regarding 
the killings). 
 During his testimony, Miles revealed that he was in 
possession of a fair amount of money on the night of the 
murders—at least “two fifties and some twenties.”  App. 183.  
In response to the Commonwealth’s questioning, Miles 
testified that the money had been in his possession even 
before he met Saranchak that night, and that it had not come 
from Saranchak’s grandmother’s home.  When Saranchak’s 
trial counsel sought to inquire further as to the money’s 
source on cross-examination, Miles invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Later, at the 
PCRA hearing, Miles admitted that the money had come from 
an unrelated robbery.  Saranchak now argues that the 
admission of Miles’s testimony without additional cross 
examination violated Saranchak’s Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause right and that trial counsel should have 
raised that argument.  However, we denied Saranchak’s 
motion to expand the COA to include this theory of 
ineffectiveness. 
 Saranchak’s third and final claim of error as to the 
degree-of-guilt phase focuses on trial counsel’s failure to 
investigate and introduce evidence of Saranchak’s mental 
health and family history to rebut a finding of intent.  This 
evidence also forms the basis for Saranchak’s penalty phase 
claims, given that it is relevant not only to Saranchak’s intent 
but also to his character and personal circumstances.  Thus, 
Saranchak urges that the evidence could have been presented 
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in support of mitigation so that jurors might have chosen not 
to sentence him to death. 
 Saranchak’s trial counsel introduced no expert medical 
testimony on Saranchak’s behalf during the degree-of-guilt 
hearing.  Instead, counsel called several of Saranchak’s 
neighbors and other members of the community who had seen 
Saranchak and Miles on the day of the murders in an attempt 
to cast doubt on Miles’s testimony, as well as to establish that 
Saranchak had been intoxicated that evening.  Carol Frantz, 
Saranchak’s girlfriend and the mother of two of his children, 
also testified that Saranchak had been drunk when he 
obtained the rifle from his stepfather’s home, and that she had 
unsuccessfully tried to prevent him from leaving.  But 
Saranchak persisted, pushing his girlfriend out of the way and 
claiming that he was “going spotting for a deer.”  App. 210.  
She also testified as to Saranchak’s often strange behavior 
when he was under the influence of alcohol.  According to 
Frantz, Saranchak “thought he was a sergeant when he was 
drunk” and would order her around.  App. 213. 
 During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth sought 
to prove two aggravating factors under Pennsylvania law:  (1) 
that Saranchak had killed his grandmother and uncle during 
the commission of a robbery and (2) that Saranchak had 
committed another murder at the time of the first murder.  42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(d)(6), (11).  To that end, the 
Commonwealth called many of the same witnesses from the 
degree-of-guilt hearing, including Roy Miles, who again 
described the manner in which Saranchak committed the 
murders.  The trial court also permitted Miles to invoke his 
Fifth Amendment privilege a second time regarding the 
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source of the money he had in his possession on the night of 
the murders.  Miles did testify again that the money came 
from neither Saranchak nor the murder victims.  Laurie 
Garber, the CYS caseworker, took the stand once again and 
repeated her testimony as to Saranchak’s second confession. 
 Trial counsel’s case in support of mitigation was 
perfunctory.  Indeed, the transcript of the penalty phase 
hearing encompassing the testimony of witnesses called in 
support of mitigation comprised a mere 40 pages, inclusive of 
the Commonwealth’s cross examination.  Frantz, Saranchak’s 
girlfriend, again testified on Saranchak’s behalf, recounting 
much of the same testimony she gave during the degree-of-
guilt hearing.  Her testimony repeated that when Saranchak 
was drunk, “[h]e tries to be demanding,” “he thinks he’s a 
sergeant,” and that he would tell her “that [she was] his 
private and he [was] [her] sergeant and [she] [would] obey his 
commands.”  App. 367.  Further, she testified that Saranchak 
would not always remember these military episodes when he 
became sober.  Counsel also called others who had testified 
during the degree-of-guilt phase and who had been with 
Saranchak on the night of the crimes, again focusing on 
Saranchak’s intoxication that evening.  Law enforcement and 
prison officials also described Saranchak as a cooperative 
inmate without disciplinary infractions. 
 Trial counsel also called Dr. Stefan Kruszewski, a 
court-appointed psychiatrist.  Kruszewski had met with 
Saranchak only once, and only to evaluate Saranchak’s 
“ability to assist in his defense, his competency to stand trial, 
and whether statements given to the police were voluntary or 
involuntary as the result of any psychiatric dysfunction.”  
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Saranchak I, 616 F.3d at 299.  Although Kruszewski had not 
yet been given the records that later were made available to 
him for PCRA purposes, Kruszewski testified during the 
penalty phase that he had evaluated Saranchak’s background 
“[t]o the extent that [he] c[ould].”  App. 389.  But Kruszewski 
could not say specifically how alcohol might have affected 
Saranchak, on the night of the murders or in general.  
Kruszewski did report, however, that Saranchak had “one 
previous psychiatric hospitalization when [he] was 21 years 
of age” due to “a significant suicide attempt.”  App. 390.  
Further, Kruszewski knew from Saranchak’s mother that 
Saranchak was “impulsive and had kind of a hot temper.”  Id.  
Nevertheless, Kruszewski described Saranchak as “extremely 
cooperative, polite[,] . . . very pleasant” and “very credible 
and very candid” during their conversation.  App. 391.  
Significantly, on cross examination Kruszewski testified that 
Saranchak had “no major psychiatric diagnosis or any mental 
disability, . . . which would prevent him from comprehending 
the ability to defend himself with the help of his counsel.”  
App. 394–95.  After hearing this testimony, the jury 
concluded that the Commonwealth had proved both 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury 
found no mitigating factors.  With two aggravating factors 
and no mitigating factors, death was mandatory.  42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). 
 The PCRA hearing revealed what evidence could have 
been introduced not only during the degree-of-guilt hearing 
regarding Saranchak’s intent, but also during the penalty 
phase to convince the jury to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  Kruszewski testified and acknowledged that 
he had possessed “almost none” of Saranchak’s background 
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information at the time of his first evaluation beyond police 
reports regarding the murders, Saranchak’s confession to 
police, as well as the criminal complaint.  App. 792.  Trial 
counsel had neither obtained nor produced for Kruszewski’s 
review any of Saranchak’s school records, medical records, or 
psychiatric records.  Indeed, trial counsel never asked 
Kruszewski to conduct an evaluation of Saranchak for the 
purpose of mitigation.  Nor had Kruszewski been informed 
specifically of Saranchak’s military delusions, though he was 
aware of Saranchak’s militaristic behavior during his 
confession to police. 
 Once Kruszewski was provided with the records of 
Saranchak’s background, Kruszewski’s evaluation of 
Saranchak changed dramatically.  Kruszewski initially had 
observed an overall “pleasant” person without any “major 
psychiatric diagnos[es].”  App. 391, 394.  Now, he believed 
that Saranchak suffered from a “Jekyll and Hyde type 
syndrome” after consuming alcohol during which his pleasant 
demeanor would worsen significantly causing him to 
experience “specific delusions that are presumably a result of 
the alcohol.”  App. 802.  Saranchak’s psychiatric records also 
revealed a history of depression along with two 
hospitalizations, one for a previously disclosed suicide 
attempt and one for “a rehab experience.”  App. 805.  Further, 
although Saranchak’s alcohol usage had been discussed at 
trial, Kruszewski’s revised opinion at the PCRA hearing 
indicated that Saranchak suffered from “a psychoactive . . . 
alcohol induced delusional disorder and alcohol induced 
depressive disorder when drinking” at the time of the killings.  
App. 808. 
 15 
 
 Dr. Harry Krop, a clinical psychologist, also testified 
on Saranchak’s behalf during the PCRA hearing.  His 
testimony further demonstrated the extensive evidence of 
mitigation that counsel could have introduced at trial, 
particularly regarding what Krop described as Saranchak’s 
“chronic psychiatric disturbance.”  App. 666.  Specifically, 
from the records of Saranchak’s psychiatric hospitalizations 
along with records indicating that he had suffered from 
“atypical pervasive developmental disorder” as a child, Krop 
diagnosed Saranchak with adult attention deficit disorder.  
App. 640.  Krop also concluded that Saranchak suffered from 
chronic polysubstance abuse.  And Krop diagnosed 
Saranchak with a “depressive disorder,” as well as a 
“personality disorder . . . with paranoid and anti-social 
features.”  App. 640–41.  According to Krop, Saranchak’s 
personality disorder had been “pervasive” since Saranchak’s 
childhood.  Krop also confirmed Saranchak’s significant 
psychological problems while drinking, during which 
Saranchak’s “distrustful” and “suspicious” tendencies 
manifested themselves into “a full blown paranoid disorder” 
or “a delusional disorder.”  App. 642–43.  Like Kruszewski, 
Krop also described a “Jekyll and Hyde personality.”  App. 
658.  And Krop opined that Saranchak’s thought processes 
were significantly impaired on the night of the murders 
themselves based on the alcohol that he had consumed.  
Combined with Saranchak’s psychological issues, Krop also 
believed that at the time of the offense, Saranchak was 
experiencing an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
 Krop also gave detailed testimony as to what, in his 
view, produced these psychological difficulties.  Beginning 
with Saranchak’s “highly dysfunctional” family history, Krop 
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observed that Saranchak’s biological father was an abusive 
alcoholic who had previously been incarcerated and that his 
mother had also been treated “for nerves and depression.”  
App. 646, 651.  According to Krop, that “abusive family” 
history was “a significant contributor” that “basically 
deformed Mr. Saranchak’s overall personality and coping 
skills and problem solving skills.”  App. 647.  When 
Saranchak began attending school, he was diagnosed with a 
developmental disorder and attended special education 
classes.  As a result, Saranchak developed a “poor self-
concept” and a “lousy perception” of himself.  App. 652.  
Saranchak turned to alcohol and drugs in an attempt to self-
medicate his mounting depression.  He became a heavy 
drinker by the age of 14.  But that substance abuse only set 
off a “spiraling effect” of increasing depression.  App. 650, 
652.  Alcohol and other drugs thus became significant, 
unusually negative influences in Saranchak’s life.  Even his 
first criminal offense as a juvenile involved the theft of 
alcohol. 
 Eventually Saranchak unsuccessfully attempted to join 
the military in an effort to turn his life around.  In Krop’s 
view, this failure resulted in an even more pronounced 
downward spiral, contributing to Saranchak’s “fantasy world 
about being in the military.”  App. 654.  Yet the only 
psychological support Saranchak sought out or otherwise 
received was in “crisis situations” in connection with his 
suicidal tendencies.  App. 656.  None of this evidence was 
introduced at trial, nor was a psychiatrist or other medical 
professional retained specifically on Saranchak’s behalf to 
probe these issues as they related to mitigation or Saranchak’s 
intent when his crimes were committed.   
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 Saranchak appeals the District Court’s rejection of his 
claim that trial counsel’s failure to procure this psychological 
evidence, coupled with counsel’s failure to seek suppression 
of both Miles’s testimony as well as Saranchak’s confession 
to police, substantially impacted his degree of guilt and the 
trial court’s conclusion that Saranchak had murdered his 
grandmother and uncle with premeditated intent.  Saranchak 
further argues that his mental health background would also 
have substantially affected the jury’s decision to sentence him 
to death.  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
II. 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees to every criminal 
defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI.  This right plays “a crucial role in the 
adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since 
access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the 
prosecution’ to which they are entitled.”  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (quoting Adams v. 
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275–76 (1942)).  
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to not just the assistance 
of counsel, but the effective assistance of counsel.  The right 
to effective counsel is necessary to protect the “fundamental 
right to a fair trial” afforded to every person accused.  Id. at 
684. 
 The test for determining whether a criminal defendant 
has been denied that right is twofold.  To establish that 
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counsel was constitutionally ineffective, “[a] petitioner must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient.”  Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687).  To meet this prong, Saranchak must demonstrate that 
his trial counsel’s representation “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness” as defined by “prevailing 
professional norms.”  Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 414 
(3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687–88).  Further, counsel’s reasonableness is 
assessed “on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the 
time of counsel’s conduct.”  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689). 
 In addition to objectively unreasonable conduct, a 
petitioner must also show that counsel’s deficiency 
“prejudiced the defense.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  To meet this standard, “[t]he 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694.  A defendant need not prove that the evidence would 
have been insufficient if not for counsel’s errors.  See 
Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 140 (3d Cir. 2011).  Nor 
need a defendant prove “that counsel’s deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 693.  But a defendant must demonstrate more than 
“that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome 
of the proceeding.”  Id.  Further, the prejudice inquiry focuses 
on “the effect the same evidence would have had on an 
unspecified, objective factfinder” rather than a particular 
decisionmaker in the case.  Saranchak I, 616 F.3d at 309. 
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 Because this case calls for the collateral review of two 
decisions by Pennsylvania state courts denying Saranchak 
postconviction relief, we must also consider for each claim 
whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 require deference to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s and the PCRA court’s determinations of 
those claims.  Section 2254 bars us from granting a writ of 
habeas corpus on Saranchak’s behalf for any claim that was 
“adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim” meets either of two conditions.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  First, we may grant habeas relief if the 
State court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”  § 2254(d)(1).  A 
decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 
precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if 
the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and 
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme 
Court’s] precedent.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–
06 (2000).   
 By contrast, a decision involves an unreasonable 
application of clearly established law where a state prisoner 
shows “that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 
there was an error well understood and comprehended in 
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 
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(2011).  Thus, a state court’s application must be “objectively 
unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not 
suffice.”  White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)).  We accord no 
deference to a state court’s resolution of a claim if that 
resolution was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, 
and we review the underlying claim de novo.  Breakiron, 642 
F.3d at 138. 
 Second, habeas relief is available to Saranchak if the 
State court proceeding “resulted in a decision that was based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  § 
2254(d)(2).  The State court’s factual findings are “presumed 
to be correct,” and Saranchak bears “the burden of rebutting 
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 
evidence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).  But “even if a state 
court’s individual factual determinations are overturned, what 
factual findings remain to support the state court decision 
must still be weighed under the overarching standard of 
section 2254(d)(2).”  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 
235–36 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. 
 Before applying these tenets to Saranchak’s 
cumulative error claim, we must identify which errors 
potentially prejudiced Saranchak.  As noted above, Saranchak 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to 
seek suppression of Roy Miles’s testimony.  His theory is that 
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permitting Miles to testify despite his invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights violated Saranchak’s Confrontation Clause 
rights.  See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 344 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“If a witness’ invocation of her rights under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution could 
interfere with a defendant’s right to cross-examine, the 
district court must ensure that the invocation did not 
‘effectively . . . emasculate the right of cross-examination 
itself.’” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 
(1985)).  But we denied Saranchak’s motion to include this 
claim in the COA.   
Saranchak acknowledges this denial, yet he urges us to 
consider any prejudice stemming from the admission of 
Miles’s testimony as part of his cumulative error claim.  
Because we denied a COA on Saranchak’s Confrontation 
Clause claim, we lack jurisdiction to now reach the merits of 
that claim.  See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 
(2003) (certificate of appealability is a “jurisdictional 
prerequisite” and “until a COA has been issued[,] federal 
courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of 
appeals from habeas petitioners”).6  If the admission of 
                                                 
6 We denied a COA on this claim “[f]or substantially the 
reasons given by the District Court.”  App. 54.  According to 
the District Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that Saranchak’s Sixth Amendment claim lacked 
even “arguable merit” was both “consistent with federal law” 
and a “reasonable determination of the relevant facts.”  
Saranchak II, 2012 WL 1414344, at *11 (quoting Saranchak-
Pa., 866 A.2d at 303).  The District Court also noted that 
“[i]nasmuch as Miles’ testimony should not have been 
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Miles’s testimony did not violate Saranchak’s Confrontation 
Clause rights, then the decision not to move to strike that 
testimony could not have contributed to any cumulative 
prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s errors related to the 
degree-of-guilt phase.  We therefore do not consider Miles’s 
testimony as erroneously admitted for the purpose of 
assessing Saranchak’s cumulative error claim. 
 Our analysis of Saranchak’s cumulative error claim at 
the degree-of-guilt hearing is thus limited to the admission of 
his confession to police, combined with trial counsel’s failure 
to introduce evidence of Saranchak’s mental health 
background as it pertained to his intent.  These claims of error 
raise several issues regarding the deference owed to the 
Pennsylvania state courts under AEDPA.  Despite its 
relatively sparse discussion of Saranchak’s cumulative error 
claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected that claim on 
the merits.  See Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 398 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he deferential standard of AEDPA applies 
even if the state court does not cite to any federal law as long 
as the state court decision is consistent with federal law.”).  
Specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
Saranchak’s cumulative error claim failed because none of 
Saranchak’s individual claims had merit.  Saranchak-Pa., 866 
A.2d at 307.7 
                                                                                                             
stricken, counsel cannot be faulted for his failure to move to 
strike it.”  Id.  
7 In doing so, the court cited its prior decision in 
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1999).  Rollins 
held that “it is axiomatic that ‘no quantity of meritless issues 
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 As to those individual claims, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court resolved Saranchak’s appeal regarding his 
attorney’s failure to suppress his confession due to a failure to 
meet both Strickland prongs.  First, the court held that 
counsel’s strategy did not prejudice Saranchak because of the 
                                                                                                             
can aggregate to form a denial of due process.’”  Id. at 452 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 367 
(1995)).  This conflicts with our previous recognition that “a 
cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that 
individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore 
not reversible” to determine whether together “they had a 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 
the jury’s verdict.”  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 139 (3d 
Cir. 2007); see also Collins v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 
742 F.3d 528, 542 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The cumulative error 
doctrine allows a petitioner to present a standalone claim 
asserting the cumulative effect of errors at trial that so 
undermined the verdict as to constitute a denial of his 
constitutional right to due process.”).  There is some debate, 
however, as to whether cumulative error claims constitute 
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court for the purposes of deference under AEDPA.  See, e.g., 
Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2005) (arguing 
post-AEDPA that “no Supreme Court precedent obligat[es] 
the state court to consider the alleged trial errors 
cumulatively”).  We need not resolve this question because, 
even assuming that cumulative error claims are clearly 
established under Supreme Court case law, Saranchak’s 
cumulative error claim fails to survive even de novo review. 
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“overwhelming evidence of [Saranchak’s] guilt.”  Id. at 301.  
Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the 
PCRA court’s finding that Saranchak had “specifically 
directed [trial counsel] not to pursue the suppression issue.”  
Id. at 302 n.12.  For that reason, “counsel had a reasonable 
basis in following his client’s instructions” and thus the 
failure to seek suppression did not constitute deficient 
conduct.  Id.8 
 We previously agreed with the court’s assessment of 
prejudice as to Saranchak’s first confession.  Although 
Saranchak’s confession to police supported the 
Commonwealth’s theory that the killing of his uncle was 
premeditated and deliberate, the other evidence in the case 
demonstrated that trial counsel’s failure to seek suppression 
of this confession did not create a reasonable probability that 
an objective factfinder would have come to a different 
conclusion.  Saranchak I, 616 F.3d at 307.  The evidence 
unaffected by Saranchak’s first confession included Miles’s 
testimony regarding the manner in which the crimes were 
committed, “the physical evidence, including the nature of the 
wounds and the fact that the shell casing was found under 
Edmund’s body,” as well as Garber’s properly admitted 
testimony concerning Saranchak’s second confession.  Id. 
                                                 
8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion that counsel 
did not act unreasonably in following his client’s instructions 
arguably requires deference under AEDPA.  But we need not 
consider the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct regarding 
Saranchak’s cumulative error claim because he fails to 
demonstrate cumulative prejudice even under de novo review. 
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 That body of evidence also undercut any conceivable 
impact of Saranchak’s mental health history at the degree-of-
guilt hearing.  We previously noted that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had erroneously applied “a subjective review 
of the evidence introduced at the PCRA hearing and analyzed 
the effect it would have had on the judge presiding, and 
acting as factfinder, at the degree of guilt hearing.”  Id. at 309 
(emphasis added).  Reviewing that evidence de novo, we 
nevertheless concluded that “[t]he Commonwealth presented 
overwhelming evidence of Saranchak’s specific intent to 
murder Edmund and Stella at the degree of guilt hearing.”  Id.  
But our consideration of Saranchak’s mental health was 
limited to whether there was a reasonable probability 
Saranchak would have been able to make out a defense of 
diminished capacity under Pennsylvania law.  Krop’s 
extensive testimony, as well as most of Kruszewski’s 
testimony as to Saranchak’s general mental health, were 
irrelevant to that defense.  See id. at 313 (noting that evidence 
of Saranchak’s “auditory hallucinations, schizoaffective 
disorder, delusion, pathological paranoia, and a tenuous 
ability to apprehend reality” was irrelevant to a diminished 
capacity defense (citing Commonwealth v. Kuzmanko, 709 
A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998))). 
 Thus, we have not previously considered trial 
counsel’s failure to present evidence of Saranchak’s mental 
health history in conjunction with the potentially erroneous 
admission of Saranchak’s confession to police as they relate 
to Saranchak’s intent.  Nor did we consider what impact the 
evidence of Saranchak’s psychological problems would have 
had on a finding of premeditated intent, as opposed to 
diminished capacity.  Although the Pennsylvania Supreme 
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Court and the PCRA court rendered opinions as to both the 
availability of a cumulative error claim as well as the merits 
of the individual errors comprising Saranchak’s claim, we 
need not resolve whether deference is owed to any state court 
on the impact of trial counsel’s alleged errors during the 
degree-of-guilt phase.  Even assessing those errors de novo, 
we conclude that Saranchak has not established prejudice. 
As we did in Saranchak I, we “must consider the 
strength of the evidence in deciding whether the Strickland 
prejudice prong has been satisfied.”  616 F.3d at 311 (quoting 
Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 1999)).  The 
untainted evidence of Saranchak’s intent was extensive.  See 
id. (listing evidence supporting Saranchak’s intentional 
killing of his grandmother and uncle).  Miles’s testimony at 
trial indicated that Saranchak had concocted a plot to rob his 
grandmother, all the while acknowledging that someone 
might be shot in the process.  Saranchak then acquired the 
murder weapon from his stepfather’s home, falsely informing 
his family that he was merely going hunting.  Saranchak then 
shot both his grandmother and his uncle in the head.  Even 
excluding Saranchak’s confession to the police concerning his 
uncle’s murder, Saranchak separately confessed in even 
greater detail to Laurie Garber.  That confession not only 
admitted his role in the deaths of Saranchak’s grandmother 
and uncle, it included an expression of motive for both 
killings.  Whether the factfinder was aware that Saranchak 
had confessed twice or only once, Saranchak’s more detailed 
confession to Garber in her CYS capacity would have had a 
similarly powerful impact. 
 Further, although the expert medical testimony at the 
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PCRA hearing regarding Saranchak’s mental health history 
was relevant to whether Saranchak actually had formed the 
premeditated intent to murder his grandmother and uncle, that 
historical evidence was far outweighed by the evidence of 
Saranchak’s state of mind on the night of the crimes.  Indeed, 
as we explained in Saranchak I, “the verdict from the degree 
of guilt hearing had ‘overwhelming record support.’”  Id. 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).  Our assessment of the 
evidence presented to the trial court has not changed.  Even 
reconsidering the impact of trial counsel’s errors in the 
aggregate, those errors did not contribute to a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome given the strength of the 
Commonwealth’s case.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s denial of Saranchak’s cumulative error claim. 
IV. 
 We next consider Saranchak’s penalty phase claims.  
Before addressing the merits, however, we consider whether 
those claims are moot.  On February 13, 2015, recently-
inaugurated Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf declared a 
moratorium on the death penalty in Pennsylvania.  Although 
neither party here contests justiciability, “[w]e have an 
independent obligation at the threshold to examine whether 
we have appellate jurisdiction.”  Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 The question we address is whether “changes in 
circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation 
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.”  Id. 
(quoting In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
The Governor’s moratorium did not abolish the death penalty 
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in Pennsylvania.  Further, one of the parties in this case, the 
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, is seeking to have 
Pennsylvania’s courts lift the moratorium as an 
unconstitutional exercise of the Governor’s authority under 
Pennsylvania law.  So not only does an Article III case or 
controversy remain, the parties have demonstrated “sufficient 
functional adversity to sharpen the issues for judicial 
resolution.”  In re Surrick, 338 F.3d at 229-30 (quoting Int’l 
Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 
1987)).  Under these circumstances, the moratorium does not 
affect our jurisdiction.  Saranchak’s penalty phase claims are 
not moot. 
A. 
 At the penalty phase, we first confront whether the 
decision of Saranchak’s trial counsel not to pursue further his 
client’s mental health and behavioral history was reasonable 
under Strickland’s first prong.9  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
                                                 
9 Saranchak claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective both because he did not investigate mitigating 
circumstances and because he failed to secure an expert to 
opine on Saranchak’s mental health pursuant to Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  In this case, we consider trial 
counsel’s failure to retain a mental health expert to be one of 
many potential investigative steps subsumed within 
Saranchak’s general failure to investigate claim.  Indeed, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also considered Saranchak’s 
Ake claim to be “merely a restatement of [Saranchak’s] initial 
contention of ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to 
obtain prior school, mental health and hospital records.”  
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Court, in disagreement with the PCRA court, concluded that 
trial counsel ended his investigation at a reasonable point.  
Specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed the 
blame for trial counsel’s failure to obtain evidence of 
Saranchak’s background on Saranchak, his girlfriend, and his 
mother.  Those three individuals “failed to provide” trial 
counsel with information regarding Saranchak’s background, 
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court characterized as “a 
specific requirement of Strickland.”  Saranchak-Pa., 866 
A.2d. at 304 n.14.  For that reason, in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s view, “at the time of the penalty hearing, 
counsel was not privy to [Saranchak’s] background 
information.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Thus, because 
“counsel’s strategic decision [not to investigate further] was 
premised upon all of the information he had available to 
him,” the court concluded that trial counsel’s behavior was 
reasonable.  Id. at 304.10 
                                                                                                             
Saranchak-Pa., 866 A.2d at 305.  Therefore, our resolution of 
Saranchak’s claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to 
investigate includes Saranchak’s claim under Ake. 
10 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined separately to 
analyze Saranchak’s Ake claim, instead holding that it failed 
“because, for all the reasons set forth supra, even assuming 
arguendo the records would have been obtained and an 
independent psychiatrist retained, the end result of this case 
would have been no different.”  Saranchak-Pa., 866 A.2d at 
305.  Although this statement is couched in terms of 
prejudice, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s resolution of 
Saranchak’s penalty phase claims turned on the purported 
reasonableness of counsel’s investigation, not prejudice.  
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 Given this resolution on the merits as to whether 
counsel’s conduct was constitutionally sufficient, we apply a 
“doubly deferential standard,” both as to whether counsel’s 
conduct was reasonable as well as to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the issue.  Breakiron, 642 F.3d 
at 141–42 (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105).  Nevertheless, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion rests on the 
premise that counsel was unaware from sources beyond 
Saranchak and his family that further investigation was 
required.  The evidence before the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court clearly and convincingly demonstrates that this premise 
was false.  Far from lacking any information regarding 
Saranchak’s background and the need for further 
investigation, trial counsel admitted during the PCRA hearing 
that his theory of defense focused on “the mental health 
issue” regarding Saranchak.  App. 698.  Trial counsel was 
also aware from multiple sources that Saranchak had 
demonstrated psychological issues, “at times” adopting “a 
character or mode” that Saranchak was in the military, which 
struck counsel as “odd.”  App. 700.  Trial counsel’s testimony 
at the PCRA hearing was not specific concerning the source 
from whom he learned about Saranchak’s militaristic 
behavior.  But the record demonstrates that he would have 
learned of that behavior at least from the police report 
regarding Saranchak’s first confession as well as from 
                                                                                                             
Accordingly, like Saranchak’s general penalty phase failure 
to investigate claim, we do not believe the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reached prejudice as to Saranchak’s penalty 
phase Ake claim.  Nevertheless, as discussed infra, the PCRA 
court reached prejudice pursuant to Ake. 
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Saranchak’s girlfriend.  Further, counsel testified that he “had 
asked some of the people when [he] was interviewing them 
around this time” about Saranchak’s military delusions.  Id.  
Thus, according to counsel, he sought a medical professional 
to evaluate whether Saranchak had “any psychiatric 
problems,” including schizophrenia and paranoia, or “whether 
there was anything abnormal,” as well as whether Saranchak 
was “understanding, whether he was competent to stand trial, 
competent to testify, [and] competent to help [counsel].”  
App. 700–01. 
 Despite this testimony, counsel did not obtain a full 
psychiatric evaluation for that purpose.  Indeed, trial counsel 
never retained a defense expert on Saranchak’s behalf, 
notwithstanding his belief that Saranchak’s mental health was 
important to his case.  Instead, counsel relied on Kruszewski, 
a neutral expert appointed to evaluate Saranchak’s 
competency to stand trial, for Saranchak’s only pretrial 
mental health evaluation.  Yet Kruszewski had not been 
appointed to evaluate Saranchak’s background, history, or 
general mental health as those factors might have pertained to 
mitigation, nor had counsel asked Kruszewski to conduct 
such an evaluation.  Trial counsel had never even provided 
Kruszewski with Saranchak’s medical records or mental 
health background, information that Kruszewski opined 
would have been necessary to conduct a more general clinical 
evaluation beyond Saranchak’s competency.  Although 
counsel explained at the PCRA hearing that Kruszewski’s 
“glowing” opinion of Saranchak persuaded him not to pursue 
Saranchak’s mental health further, App. 703, it was not 
strategically reasonable for counsel to cite Kruszewski’s 
opinion of Saranchak’s competency as a basis for ruling out 
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further investigation of Saranchak’s mental health as it related 
to mitigation. 
 Indeed, despite Kruszewski’s initially positive 
impression of Saranchak, the report Kruszewski gave to trial 
counsel revealed significant red flags—red flags which 
suggested that further investigation was warranted.  That 
report showed that “Saranchak stated that he was previously 
treated at the Pottsville Hospital and Warne Clinic” and that 
“he was treated for one month under the care of Dr. Richard 
Wagner.”  Saranchak v. Beard, No. 05-cv-00317, Appendix 
by Daniel Saranchak, Ex. 1, at 6 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2005) 
(Docket No. 9) (hereinafter “Kruszewski Rep.”).  Saranchak 
had also previously ingested “250 pills” in response to his 
wife’s affair, although Saranchak “did not admit to a previous 
suicide attempt.”  Id. at 5, 8.  Kruszewski concluded from his 
meeting with Saranchak that he was competent to stand trial, 
but noted that Saranchak appeared to suffer from a 
“[p]ersonality disorder, . . . with anti-social traits.”  Id. at 9.  
Given that all of this information was available to trial 
counsel at the time he chose to end his investigation, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s finding that trial counsel was 
“not privy to” enough background information, Saranchak-
Pa., 866 A.2d. at 304 n.14, was incorrect by “clear and 
convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), and reflects “an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 
§ 2254(d)(2).  
 Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis 
was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland’s 
requirements pursuant to § 2254(d)(1).  Nowhere in 
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Strickland or in any other case has the Supreme Court stated 
that trial counsel need pursue mitigation evidence related to a 
defendant’s mental health only if a defendant or his family 
specifically informs counsel of the defendant’s background, 
despite trial counsel’s existing knowledge that his client’s 
mental health was a significant issue.  To the contrary, 
Strickland states that “a particular decision not to investigate 
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, “strategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations 
on investigation.”  Id. at 690–91.  We acknowledge that 
“inquiry into counsel’s conversations with the defendant may 
be critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s investigation 
decisions,” and in certain cases may be determinative.  Id. at 
691.  But a defendant’s failure personally to inform his 
counsel of possible avenues of investigation does not absolve 
his attorney from pursuing those avenues, particularly where 
counsel is already aware of facts demonstrating that such an 
investigation may be fruitful.   
 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), is instructive, and was available 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at the time of its decision.  
Like Saranchak’s claim of error here, Wiggins involved an 
ineffectiveness claim “stem[ming] from counsel’s decision to 
limit the scope of their investigation into potential mitigation 
evidence.”  Id. at 521.  Counsel in Wiggins had obtained some 
information of the defendant’s troubled past through a 
presentence investigation report, certain social service 
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records, and a number of tests conducted by a psychologist.  
Id. at 523–24.  Yet “counsel abandoned their investigation of 
petitioner’s background after having acquired only 
rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of 
sources,” id. at 524, and despite having uncovered “no 
evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation 
case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or 
that further investigation would have been fruitless,” id. at 
525.  By failing to consider “not only the quantum of 
evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the 
known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to 
investigate further,” the conclusion of the Maryland Court of 
Appeals that counsel’s investigation was strategically 
permissible was thus an objectively unreasonable application 
of Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 527–28. 
 So too here.  Both we and the Supreme Court have 
often considered the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) 
guidelines regarding the conduct of capital counsel to assess 
counsel’s performance.  See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 
U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (noting that 
the Supreme Court “long ha[s] referred” to “the standards for 
capital defense work articulated by the [ABA] . . . as ‘guides 
to determining what is reasonable’” (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688)); Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; Blystone v. Horn, 
664 F.3d 397, 419–20 (3d Cir. 2011); Bond v. Beard, 539 
F.3d 256, 288 (3d Cir. 2008); Outten, 464 F.3d at 417; see 
also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (noting that “[p]revailing 
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides” (citation omitted)).  
Those guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating 
 35 
 
evidence “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably 
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any 
aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the 
prosecutor.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel 
in Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”) 11.4.1(C), at 93 
(1989)).11  Further, “[t]he investigation for preparation of the 
sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any 
initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be 
offered.”  ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(C).  As the commentary to 
the ABA Guidelines explains, “[c]ounsel’s duty to investigate 
is not negated by the expressed desires of a client.”  ABA 
Guidelines 11.4.1, commentary.  That investigation should 
include a defendant’s medical history, educational history, 
military history, family and social history, and prior adult and 
juvenile record.  Id. 11.4.1(D)(2)(C).  Defense counsel should 
also retain an expert “where it is necessary or appropriate for . 
. . presentation of mitigation.”  Id. 11.4.1(D)(7)(D); see also 
Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder 
Ake, ‘when a capital defendant demonstrates that his mental 
condition is a significant factor at his sentencing phase, he is 
entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist . . . .” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Roman, 121 
F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir. 1997))). 
 Counsel’s investigation here fell woefully short, under 
standards expressed both in clear Supreme Court precedent 
                                                 
11 The ABA updated its guidelines for defense counsel in 
capital cases in 2003.  But because trial counsel’s conduct 
occurred in 1994, we look to the guidelines promulgated in 
1989. 
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and as set forth by the ABA’s professional guidelines.  
Further, given counsel’s failure to investigate despite his 
awareness of the significance to the defense of Saranchak’s 
mental health, we are convinced that “there is no possibility 
fairminded jurists could disagree” that counsel’s conduct was 
unreasonable.  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.  Even assuming 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was correct that counsel 
learned nothing from Saranchak, his girlfriend,12 or his 
mother regarding Saranchak’s mental health, his abusive 
upbringing, or his dysfunctional family, counsel nevertheless 
learned from Kruszewski about Saranchak’s previous 
psychiatric hospitalization as well as his suicide attempt and 
depression.  Counsel himself also acknowledged that he 
believed Saranchak’s mental health was a major issue in the 
case.  And counsel was aware of Saranchak’s militaristic 
posture during his confession.  Yet counsel did not retain an 
expert on Saranchak’s behalf or seek further medical 
evaluation.  Instead, counsel was content with the court-
appointed expert’s investigation of only Saranchak’s 
competency to stand trial.  Counsel did not even obtain the 
records regarding the psychiatric hospitalization that was 
reflected in Kruszewski’s report, much less Saranchak’s 
school records or other hospitalization records.  Even the 
Commonwealth conceded in its brief and at oral argument 
that trial counsel’s investigation was inadequate.  
                                                 
12 Saranchak’s girlfriend stated repeatedly at trial that 
Saranchak believed he was a military sergeant when he was 
drinking.  That unusual behavior should have given trial 
counsel some indication that further psychological inquiry 
was called for. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel’s performance at 
the penalty phase was unreasonably deficient, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary was 
objectively unreasonable. 
B. 
 We turn then to whether counsel’s failure to 
investigate and present Saranchak’s mental health history 
prejudiced Saranchak.  As noted above, the Commonwealth 
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Saranchak had 
committed the murders in the course of a robbery and that his 
crime involved the murder of two people, both aggravating 
circumstances under Pennsylvania law.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 9711(d)(6), (11).  A sentence of death is mandatory “if 
the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating 
circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating 
circumstances or if the jury unanimously finds one or more 
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances.”  § 9711(c)(1)(iv).  The Commonwealth must 
prove aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but a defendant need prove mitigating circumstances by only 
a preponderance.  § 9711(c)(1)(iii).  Death sentences in 
Pennsylvania must be unanimous.  That means that Saranchak 
would have been sentenced to life imprisonment—not 
death—if even one juror had found that the aggravating 
circumstances did not outweigh any mitigating circumstances.  
§ 9711(c)(1)(iv); see also Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 309 
(3d Cir. 2001) (prejudice can be shown if there is a 
reasonable probability that one juror would not have 
sentenced defendant to death).  Here, Saranchak sought to 
prove that his capacity “to appreciate the criminality of his 
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conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired.”  § 9711(e)(3).  Further, 
Saranchak sought to prove the “catchall” mitigating 
circumstances for “[a]ny other evidence of mitigation 
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the 
circumstances of his offense.”  § 9711(e)(8). 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not reach 
Strickland’s prejudice prong as to Saranchak’s penalty phase 
claims.  But the PCRA court held that Saranchak suffered no 
prejudice at the penalty phase stemming from trial counsel’s 
failure to introduce the evidence of Saranchak’s mental health 
revealed post-trial.  Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 889A-1993, 
at 17–18.13  “The lack of an express ruling from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the question of prejudice 
does not negate the PCRA court’s decision that [Saranchak] 
was not prejudiced.”  Collins, 742 F.3d at 546.  Thus, we 
must view the PCRA court’s conclusion on that prong 
through AEDPA’s lens.  Id. 
 For Saranchak’s penalty phase claim, the PCRA court 
correctly described the standard for prejudice under 
                                                 
13 The PCRA court also concluded that Saranchak had failed 
to establish prejudice as to his Ake claim based on the PCRA 
court’s “resolution of the previous allegations of 
ineffectiveness related to the presentation of the diminished 
capacity defense and mitigation evidence.”  Saranchak-
PCRA, No. 889, 889A-1993, at 17.  Our analysis of the 
prejudice Saranchak suffered at the penalty phase of his trial 
from counsel’s failure to investigate mitigating circumstances 
thus includes prejudice stemming from his claim under Ake. 
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Strickland as requiring Saranchak to show “the reasonable 
probability that, absent trial counsel’s failure to present 
mitigating evidence, he would have been able to prove at least 
one mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the 
evidence and that at least one jury member would have 
concluded that the mitigating circumstance(s) outweighed the 
aggravating circumstance(s).”  Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 
889A-1993, at 16 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ford, 809 A.2d 
325, 332 (Pa. 2002)).  At other points in its opinion, the 
PCRA court also described the prejudice inquiry as analyzing 
whether “there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different” if counsel had not 
been ineffective.  Id. at 3, 6 (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Marshall, 812 A.2d 539, 545 (Pa. 2002)). 
Much of the PCRA court’s analysis regarding 
Saranchak’s psychological problems related to the evidence 
of Saranchak’s intent produced at trial in comparison with 
Kruszewski’s opinion at the PCRA hearing.  In Kruszewski’s 
view, Saranchak had been “acutely intoxicated at the time of 
the killings and was actively delusional, believing that he was 
on a military mission.”  Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 889A-
1993, at 17.  Thus, Kruszewski had opined that Saranchak 
had suffered from an “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” at the time of the killings, and that his “capacity 
. . . to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law” had been 
substantially impaired.  Id.  The PCRA court rejected this 
testimony, holding that Kruszewski’s opinion was 
“completely incredible and deserving of no weight” on this 
point given the evidence at trial of Saranchak’s deliberate, 
non-delusional conduct.  We agree that the Commonwealth’s 
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evidence of Saranchak’s intent and lack of “substantially 
impaired” capacity was generally strong for the same reasons 
that we rejected Saranchak’s degree-of-guilt cumulative error 
claim.  The PCRA court’s finding that Kruszewski was not 
credible as to whether Saranchak could have established the 
existence of these mitigating circumstances thus deserves 
deference. 
But the PCRA court also observed that the evidence of 
Saranchak’s mental health produced at the PCRA hearing 
“could have satisfied the catchall mitigating circumstance” 
permitting the jury to consider any aspects of Saranchak’s 
character, record, or the circumstances of the offense.  § 
9711(e)(8).  Nevertheless, the PCRA court summarily 
rejected Saranchak’s argument that there was a reasonable 
probability the outcome would have been different, even if 
Saranchak could have proven the existence of the catchall 
mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 889A-1993, at 18.  Noting that 
the jury would still have been required to weigh Saranchak’s 
mental health and background against the aggravating 
circumstances, the PCRA court concluded that “[u]nder the 
circumstances of this case, we do not believe that . . . the 
existence of the catchall mitigating circumstance would have 
swayed even one member of the jury to render a sentence of 
life imprisonment rather than death.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
The PCRA court did not discuss Kruszewski’s changed 
diagnosis of Saranchak’s general mental health beyond 
whether Saranchak’s crimes were intentional on the night of 
the killings.  And inexplicably, the PCRA court failed to even 
mention the diagnoses provided by Dr. Krop.  Likewise, the 
PCRA court did not mention any of the other additional 
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witnesses who testified or submitted affidavits at the PCRA 
hearing on Saranchak’s behalf. 
Although the PCRA court had previously recited the 
correct standard to determine whether Saranchak suffered 
prejudice, its ostensible application of that standard raises 
serious doubt that the correct analysis was in fact undertaken.  
The test for prejudice in this context is not whether Saranchak 
“would have swayed even one member of the jury to render a 
sentence of life imprisonment rather than death,” as the 
PCRA court stated.  Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 889A-1993, 
at 18 (emphasis added).  Formulating the test in that fashion 
places a higher burden on Saranchak than Strickland requires.  
Indeed, Strickland makes clear that the prejudice inquiry 
focuses on whether the defendant has shown merely “a 
reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been 
different absent counsel’s errors.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
If the PCRA court indeed applied a heightened, outcome-
determinative standard, its analysis would thus reflect a 
misapplication of Strickland. 
Nor was this the PCRA court’s only misstatement of 
the law.  When it analyzed prejudice in relation to the failure 
to suppress Saranchak’s first confession to police, the PCRA 
court used similarly erroneous language.  The PCRA court 
concluded that even if trial counsel had been deficient in 
failing to pursue that argument, “the outcome of the degree of 
guilt hearing would not have been different” and thus 
Saranchak suffered no prejudice.  Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 
889A-1993, at 11–12 (emphasis added).  Moreover, the 
PCRA court apparently reached that conclusion because 
“[t]he Commonwealth’s evidence against [Saranchak], 
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exclusive of his incriminating statements to police, was 
sufficient to establish his guilt of first degree murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 12 (emphasis added).  This too was 
error, given that Strickland prejudice does not depend on the 
sufficiency of the evidence despite counsel’s mistakes.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can 
be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 
even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the 
outcome.”).  Rather, “[a] reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id. at 694.  And although the PCRA court did not 
reach prejudice related to the failure to suppress Saranchak’s 
confession to the CYS caseworker, had it done so the PCRA 
court stated that it would have analyzed “whether the 
outcome would have been different if the statements would 
have been suppressed.”  Saranchak-PCRA, No. 889, 889A-
1993, at 13.  None of these statements are accurate 
characterizations of the law. 
Despite these inaccuracies, we must presume “that 
state courts know and follow the law.”  Woodford v. Visciotti, 
537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).  Section 2254 also requires us to 
apply a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court 
rulings” and give state court decisions “the benefit of the 
doubt.”  Id. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because the 
PCRA court in other areas of its opinion correctly described 
the prejudice standard when it quoted the law generally 
applicable to ineffectiveness claims, whether it actually 
applied a standard contrary to clearly established federal law 
is not entirely clear.  Nevertheless, the PCRA court’s repeated 
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misstatements of the law, particularly its application at one 
point of a sufficiency of the evidence test to demonstrate that 
the outcome “would not have been different,” Saranchak-
PCRA, No. 889, 889A-1993, at 12, indicate to us that the 
PCRA court misapprehended Strickland’s prejudice prong.   
We concluded in Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 
140 (3d Cir. 2011), that a similar method of analysis was both 
“contrary to and an unreasonable application of Strickland.”  
Breakiron called for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
determine whether counsel’s failure to request a lesser-
included offense instruction had prejudiced his client.  Id.  
We did not defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
resolution of that issue because it had “partial[ly] reli[ed]” on 
a “sufficiency of the evidence standard” without weighing the 
evidence as a whole “to determine whether there was a 
reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been 
different.  Id.  To be sure, the PCRA court here did not state 
expressly that it was relying on a sufficiency determination in 
conducting its prejudice analysis of Saranchak’s penalty 
phase claims.  But the PCRA court did make its sufficiency 
analysis explicit in other parts of its opinion, and one would 
not expect the PCRA court to apply two different methods of 
analysis to determine whether Saranchak suffered prejudice 
from his different claims of ineffectiveness.  Accordingly, we 
believe that the PCRA court was consistent in its prejudice 
analysis and that its application of a sufficiency standard to 
determine prejudice as to one of Saranchak’s degree-of-guilt 
phase claims means that it applied a similarly erroneous 
standard to Saranchak’s penalty phase claim.  Thus, at the 
very least, the PCRA court’s analysis constituted an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 
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under § 2254(d)(1).  See also Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 
F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a state court’s 
holding was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 
law where the state court concluded that a defendant suffered 
no prejudice because he “failed to show the examination 
would have established [he] was incompetent to stand trial”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 The PCRA court’s failure to discuss the vast majority 
of the relevant evidence presented at the PCRA hearing 
further buttresses our conclusion that its analysis was 
unreasonable.  The proper prejudice analysis would have 
required the PCRA court “to evaluate the totality of the 
available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and 
the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding in reweighing 
it against the evidence in aggravation.”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 
397–98.  Yet the PCRA court did not discuss Krop’s 
testimony, or Kruszewski’s testimony as it related to 
Saranchak’s mental health generally as opposed to his 
behavior on the night of the murders.  Instead, the PCRA 
court brushed aside Saranchak’s childhood and mental health 
problems without analysis, despite the fact that the jury 
“heard almost nothing that would humanize [Saranchak] or 
allow them to accurately gauge his moral culpability.”  Porter 
v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009). 
 Here, the PCRA hearing revealed that Saranchak’s 
troubled past and psychological problems were significant 
factors affecting his life.  Yet the testimony that the jury 
considered at trial only hinted at Saranchak’s substance abuse 
and his alcohol-induced military fantasies.  Indeed, the depth 
of Saranchak’s problems were made apparent only after 
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Saranchak’s hospital and school records were obtained and an 
expert was finally retained on Saranchak’s behalf to opine on 
mitigating circumstances.  None of Saranchak’s major 
psychological diagnoses were revealed to the jury. 
Kruszewski, unaware of the magnitude of Saranchak’s 
troubled past, instead testified that Saranchak suffered “no 
major psychiatric diagnosis.”  App. 394.  Far from “barely . . . 
alter[ing] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing 
judge,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, the differences between 
the portrait of Saranchak’s troubled life that could have been 
presented to the jury and the one actually presented were 
stark.  The PCRA court’s conclusion, without analysis, that 
not even one juror “would have [been] swayed,” Saranchak-
PCRA, No. 889, 889A-1993, at 18, indicated the PCRA court 
either “did not consider or unreasonably discounted the 
mitigation evidence adduced in the postconviction hearing,” 
Porter, 558 U.S. at 42.  Indeed, given that death sentences 
must be unanimous under Pennsylvania law, 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), “persuading even one juror to 
vote for life imprisonment could have made all the 
difference.”  Outten, 464 F.3d at 422.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the evidence at the PCRA hearing satisfied 
Strickland’s prejudice prong, and the PCRA court’s analysis 
was an unreasonable application of clearly established 
Supreme Court case law. 
V. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm that part of the 
District Court’s judgment denying Saranchak’s petition for 
habeas corpus due to trial counsel’s cumulative errors at his 
degree-of-guilt hearing.  We will reverse in part the judgment 
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of the District Court and remand with instructions to grant a 
provisional writ of habeas corpus directed to the penalty 
phase.  Unless the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania conducts 
a new sentencing hearing, Saranchak shall be sentenced to 
life imprisonment. 
